Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Menedemus, Arnauld / Nicole and J.L. Mackie

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19 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We know by abstraction because we only understand composite things a part at a time [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
No one denies that a line has width, but we can just attend to its length [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
The propositions that God is good and omnipotent, and that evil exists, are logically contradictory [Mackie, by PG]
Is evil an illusion, or a necessary contrast, or uncontrollable, or necessary for human free will? [Mackie, by PG]