Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Menedemus, Anand Vaidya and Walter Burley

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
Days exist, and yet they seem to be made up of parts which don't exist [Burley]
Unlike permanent things, successive things cannot exist all at once [Burley]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
The primary qualities are mixed to cause secondary qualities [Burley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]