9 ideas
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
| 9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
| 16697 | Time is independent of motion, because God could stop everything for a short or long time [Crathorn, by Pasnau] |
| 9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |
| 9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |