43 ideas
| 10476 | The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W] |
| 10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
| 10282 | Logic is the study of sound argument, or of certain artificial languages (or applying the latter to the former) [Hodges,W] |
| 10478 | Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W] |
| 10477 | |= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W] |
| 10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
| 10283 | A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables [Hodges,W] |
| 10284 | There are three different standard presentations of semantics [Hodges,W] |
| 10285 | I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I [Hodges,W] |
| 10474 | |= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W] |
| 10475 | A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W] |
| 10473 | Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W] |
| 10481 | Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W] |
| 10289 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if infinite models, then arbitrarily large models [Hodges,W] |
| 10288 | Down Löwenheim-Skolem: if a countable language has a consistent theory, that has a countable model [Hodges,W] |
| 10287 | If a first-order theory entails a sentence, there is a finite subset of the theory which entails it [Hodges,W] |
| 10480 | First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W] |
| 10286 | A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class [Hodges,W] |
| 14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
| 10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
| 10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
| 14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
| 10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
| 10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
| 10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
| 10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
| 10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
| 14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
| 10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
| 10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
| 10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
| 10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
| 10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
| 10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
| 10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
| 10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |