67 ideas
| 12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
| 12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
| 10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
| 10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
| 8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
| 8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
| 10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
| 10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
| 8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
| 10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
| 8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
| 12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
| 12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
| 12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
| 18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
| 10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
| 5937 | The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross] |
| 5936 | Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross] |
| 5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross] |
| 5940 | Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross] |
| 5924 | Identical objects must have identical value [Ross] |
| 10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
| 8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
| 12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
| 12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
| 12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
| 10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
| 5933 | Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross] |
| 5928 | Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross] |
| 5911 | Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross] |
| 5926 | The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross] |
| 7259 | Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J] |
| 5913 | The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross] |
| 5920 | Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross] |
| 5923 | The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross] |
| 5918 | The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross] |
| 5930 | All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross] |
| 5922 | An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross] |
| 5921 | We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross] |
| 5910 | The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross] |
| 5932 | The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross] |
| 5898 | 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross] |
| 5899 | If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross] |
| 5904 | In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross] |
| 5919 | Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross] |
| 5941 | Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross] |
| 5938 | Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross] |
| 5931 | All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross] |
| 5939 | Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross] |
| 5905 | We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross] |
| 5929 | No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross] |
| 5906 | Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross] |
| 18622 | Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross] |
| 5908 | Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross] |
| 5917 | People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross] |
| 5900 | We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross] |
| 5909 | Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG] |
| 5942 | We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross] |
| 5914 | An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross] |
| 5912 | We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross] |
| 5916 | Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross] |
| 5915 | Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross] |