Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Vassilis Politis and Marcus Rossberg

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18 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
11257 The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
11235 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10757 Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg]
10751 Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg]
10759 There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10753 Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
10752 Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
10754 In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10756 A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
10758 If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10761 Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
10755 A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
11277 Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11248 Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]