11 ideas
| 17950 | The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas] |
| 17951 | A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
| 17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
| 17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
| 18088 | Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place] |
| 18089 | Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place] |