111 ideas
6123 | Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour [Merricks] |
19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks] |
14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
14408 | Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks] |
14395 | If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks] |
14398 | Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks] |
14403 | If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks] |
14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
14396 | If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks] |
14400 | If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks] |
14394 | It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks] |
14390 | Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks] |
14412 | Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks] |
14414 | I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks] |
14418 | Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks] |
14391 | If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks] |
19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
14419 | Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks] |
19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks] |
15413 | With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess] |
15415 | The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess] |
19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks] |
15430 | Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess] |
15431 | It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess] |
15429 | Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess] |
15404 | Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess] |
15405 | Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess] |
15421 | Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess] |
15427 | The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess] |
15403 | Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess] |
15407 | Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess] |
15424 | Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess] |
15409 | All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess] |
15414 | The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess] |
15406 | 'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess] |
15426 | We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess] |
15425 | The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess] |
15408 | 'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess] |
15418 | Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess] |
15411 | We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess] |
15412 | Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess] |
19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks] |
15416 | We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess] |
15428 | The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess] |
10185 | Set theory is the standard background for modern mathematics [Burgess] |
10184 | Structuralists take the name 'R' of the reals to be a variable ranging over structures, not a structure [Burgess] |
10189 | There is no one relation for the real number 2, as relations differ in different models [Burgess] |
10186 | If set theory is used to define 'structure', we can't define set theory structurally [Burgess] |
10187 | Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess] |
10188 | How can mathematical relations be either internal, or external, or intrinsic? [Burgess] |
14393 | The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks] |
6143 | Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
6135 | A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks] |
14413 | Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks] |
6145 | Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists [Merricks] |
14416 | An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks] |
6124 | I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks] |
6134 | Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks] |
14392 | Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks] |
6125 | We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks] |
14229 | Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Merricks, by Liggins] |
6142 | The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways [Merricks] |
14472 | If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Merricks, by Thomasson] |
14469 | Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage [Merricks] |
6137 | Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) [Merricks] |
6141 | There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks] |
6127 | 'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks] |
6131 | Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks] |
6132 | Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks] |
6130 | 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks] |
6138 | It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks] |
6128 | Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks] |
14410 | You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks] |
19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
6136 | Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks] |
15420 | De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess] |
15417 | Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess] |
15419 | General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess] |
15423 | It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess] |
15422 | Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess] |
14417 | Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks] |
6133 | If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks] |
14402 | If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks] |
6150 | The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks] |
6144 | You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software [Merricks] |
6140 | Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons [Merricks] |
6149 | Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks] |
6148 | Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks] |
6147 | The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks] |
6146 | Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks] |
19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks] |
19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks] |
19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks] |
19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks] |
19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks] |
19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks] |
19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks] |
19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks] |
19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks] |
17960 | Eternalism says all times are equally real, and future and past objects and properties are real [Merricks] |
17961 | Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart [Merricks, by PG] |
14407 | Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks] |
14411 | Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks] |
14406 | Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks] |
14405 | How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks] |