13 ideas
| 20183 | So-called 'though experiments' are just philosophers observing features of the world [Cappelen] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 19718 | Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann] |
| 20182 | The word 'intuitive' often plays not role at all in arguments, and can be removed [Cappelen] |
| 19717 | Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann] |
| 19716 | Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann] |
| 19715 | You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann] |
| 19714 | Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann] |
| 19713 | Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann] |
| 19719 | 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann] |