Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Stephen S. Colvin and Christine M. Korsgaard

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard]
A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard]
For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard]