13 ideas
20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
8616 | How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? [Elgin] |
8617 | Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true [Elgin] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
8618 | Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin] |