11 ideas
8956 | What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
8953 | Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
19691 | Unlike knowledge, you can achieve understanding through luck [Grimm] |
19690 | 'Grasping' a structure seems to be modal, because we must anticipate its behaviour [Grimm] |
19692 | You may have 'weak' understanding, if by luck you can answer a set of 'why questions' [Grimm] |
8954 | Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó] |
8955 | Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó] |