53 ideas
13966 | Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames] |
13974 | If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames] |
15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
13969 | Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames] |
15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
13973 | A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames] |
13968 | Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames] |
15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
13965 | Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames] |
13964 | Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames] |
13972 | Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames] |
15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
20489 | Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J] |
20483 | Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J] |
20532 | Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J] |
20490 | For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J] |
20493 | Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J] |
20494 | Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J] |
20500 | We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J] |
20497 | How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J] |
20506 | 'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J] |
20530 | Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J] |
20487 | A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J] |
20488 | It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J] |
20529 | Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J] |
20510 | A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J] |
20511 | Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J] |
20502 | Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J] |
20496 | A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J] |
20498 | We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J] |
20499 | Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J] |
20509 | Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J] |
20524 | Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J] |
20518 | Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J] |
20531 | Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J] |
20526 | Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J] |
20528 | Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J] |
20503 | Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J] |
20513 | If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J] |
20512 | Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J] |
20514 | If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J] |
20522 | Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J] |
20534 | Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J] |
20492 | Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J] |