15 ideas
| 17833 | The first-order ZF axiomatisation is highly non-categorical [Hallett,M] |
| 17834 | Non-categoricity reveals a sort of incompleteness, with sets existing that the axioms don't reveal [Hallett,M] |
| 17837 | Zermelo allows ur-elements, to enable the widespread application of set-theory [Hallett,M] |
| 17836 | The General Continuum Hypothesis and its negation are both consistent with ZF [Hallett,M] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 14221 | Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski] |
| 14222 | Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski] |
| 14226 | We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski] |
| 14225 | Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski] |
| 14223 | De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski] |
| 9220 | Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider] |
| 14224 | Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski] |