Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Samuel Johnson and Richard G. Heck

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16 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
The meaning of a number isn't just the numerals leading up to it [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
A basic grasp of cardinal numbers needs an understanding of equinumerosity [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
In counting, numerals are used, not mentioned (as objects that have to correlated) [Heck]
Counting is the assignment of successively larger cardinal numbers to collections [Heck]
Is counting basically mindless, and independent of the cardinality involved? [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
Understanding 'just as many' needn't involve grasping one-one correspondence [Heck]
We can know 'just as many' without the concepts of equinumerosity or numbers [Heck]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Frege's Theorem explains why the numbers satisfy the Peano axioms [Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Children can use numbers, without a concept of them as countable objects [Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Equinumerosity is not the same concept as one-one correspondence [Heck]
We can understand cardinality without the idea of one-one correspondence [Heck]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
All theory is against free will, and all experience is in favour of it [Johnson,S]