Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Robert Boyle and Alexander Miller

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26 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Essential definitions show the differences that discriminate things, and make them what they are [Boyle]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Boyle attacked a contemporary belief that powers were occult things [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Form is not a separate substance, but just the manner, modification or 'stamp' of matter [Boyle]
To cite a substantial form tells us what produced the effect, but not how it did it [Boyle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Boyle's term 'texture' is not something you feel, but is unobservable structures of particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
Boyle's secondary qualities are not illusory, or 'in the mind' [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is generally to deduce it from something better known, which comes in degrees [Boyle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Explanation is deducing a phenomenon from some nature better known to us [Boyle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
The corpuscles just have shape, size and motion, which explains things without 'sympathies' or 'forces' [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
The corpuscular theory allows motion, but does not include forces between the particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
I don't see how mere moving matter can lead to the bodies of men and animals, and especially their seeds [Boyle]