34 ideas
| 6259 | Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne] |
| 6263 | No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne] |
| 23122 | Montaigne was the founding father of liberalism [Montaigne, by Gopnik] |
| 19090 | If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty] |
| 2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
| 2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
| 6258 | Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne] |
| 4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
| 2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 6262 | We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
| 6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
| 6260 | Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne] |
| 2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
| 2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
| 2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
| 6261 | The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne] |
| 2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
| 2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
| 2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
| 2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
| 2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
| 7496 | Rules and duties are based on the will, as that is all we control [Montaigne] |
| 7495 | Apart from the fear, dying is an easy duty [Montaigne] |
| 22269 | We must fight fiercely to hang on to the few pleasures which survive into old age [Montaigne] |
| 20482 | Virtue inspires Stoics, but I want a good temperament [Montaigne] |
| 20480 | There is not much point in only becoming good near the end of your life [Montaigne] |
| 2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |
| 20481 | Nothing we say can be worse than unsaying it in the face of authority [Montaigne] |
| 20479 | People at home care far more than soldiers risking death about the outcome of wars [Montaigne] |