Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P and Terence Horgan

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11 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T]
'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T]
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T]
Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T]
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T]