Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Ralph Cudworth and James O. Young

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22 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
19079 For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19077 Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
19076 Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
19078 Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
19084 Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
19083 How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19075 Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
6230 If the soul were a tabula rasa, with no innate ideas, there could be no moral goodness or justice [Cudworth]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
6228 Senses cannot judge one another, so what judges senses cannot be a sense, but must be superior [Cudworth]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
6229 Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19074 Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
19082 Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
6227 Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
6231 There is a self-determing power in each person, which makes them what they are [Cudworth]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
6225 Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws [Cudworth]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
6224 An omnipotent will cannot make two things equal or alike if they aren't [Cudworth]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
6223 If the will and pleasure of God controls justice, then anything wicked or unjust would become good if God commanded it [Cudworth]
6226 The requirement that God must be obeyed must precede any authority of God's commands [Cudworth]