11 ideas
| 8460 | Philosophers have given precise senses to deduction, probability, computability etc [Quine/Ullian] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 5673 | If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam] |
| 5670 | Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam] |
| 5671 | Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam] |
| 5672 | Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam] |
| 5675 | Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam] |
| 5674 | We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam] |