11 ideas
| 8833 | Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 18528 | The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol] |
| 8834 | Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P] |
| 8838 | If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P] |
| 8839 | Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P] |
| 16589 | Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol] |
| 16651 | God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol] |