Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Paul Thagard and Correia,F/Schnieder,B

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence problems have positive and negative restraints; solutions maximise constraint satisfaction [Thagard]
Coherence is explanatory, deductive, conceptual, analogical, perceptual, and deliberative [Thagard]
Explanatory coherence needs symmetry,explanation,analogy,data priority, contradiction,competition,acceptance [Thagard]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Verisimilitude comes from including more phenomena, and revealing what underlies [Thagard]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Neither a priori rationalism nor sense data empiricism account for scientific knowledge [Thagard]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayesian inference is forced to rely on approximations [Thagard]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
3: If an analogous pair explain another analogous pair, then they all cohere [Thagard, by Smart]
1: Coherence is a symmetrical relation between two propositions [Thagard, by Smart]
4: For coherence, observation reports have a degree of intrinsic acceptability [Thagard, by Smart]
5: Contradictory propositions incohere [Thagard, by Smart]
6: A proposition's acceptability depends on its coherence with a system [Thagard, by Smart]
2: An explanation must wholly cohere internally, and with the new fact [Thagard, by Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The best theory has the highest subjective (Bayesian) probability? [Thagard]