59 ideas
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
| 6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
| 6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
| 6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
| 6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
| 6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
| 23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
| 6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
| 6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 8431 | Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 2799 | Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich] |
| 2798 | Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich] |
| 6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
| 6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
| 6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |
| 20489 | Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J] |
| 20483 | Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J] |
| 20532 | Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J] |
| 20490 | For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J] |
| 20493 | Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J] |
| 20494 | Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J] |
| 20500 | We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J] |
| 20497 | How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J] |
| 20506 | 'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J] |
| 20530 | Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J] |
| 20487 | A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J] |
| 20488 | It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J] |
| 20529 | Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J] |
| 20510 | A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J] |
| 20511 | Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J] |
| 20502 | Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J] |
| 20496 | A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J] |
| 20498 | We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J] |
| 20499 | Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J] |
| 20509 | Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J] |
| 20524 | Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J] |
| 20518 | Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J] |
| 20531 | Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J] |
| 20526 | Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J] |
| 20528 | Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J] |
| 20503 | Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J] |
| 20512 | Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J] |
| 20513 | If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J] |
| 20514 | If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J] |
| 20522 | Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J] |
| 20534 | Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J] |
| 20492 | Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J] |
| 8432 | Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich] |