374 ideas
| 11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
| 11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
| 11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
| 11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
| 11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
| 11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
| 11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
| 11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
| 11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
| 11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
| 11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
| 11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
| 11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
| 11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
| 11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
| 11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
| 11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
| 11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
| 11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
| 11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
| 11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
| 11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
| 11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
| 11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
| 11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
| 11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
| 11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
| 11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
| 11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
| 11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
| 11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
| 11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
| 11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
| 11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
| 11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
| 11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
| 11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
| 11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
| 11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
| 11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
| 11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
| 11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
| 11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
| 11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
| 11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
| 11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
| 11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
| 11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
| 11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
| 11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
| 11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
| 11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
| 11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
| 11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
| 11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
| 11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
| 11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
| 11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
| 11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
| 11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
| 11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
| 11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
| 11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
| 11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
| 11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
| 11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
| 11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
| 11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
| 11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
| 11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
| 11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
| 11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
| 11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
| 11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
| 11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
| 11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
| 11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
| 11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
| 11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
| 11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
| 11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
| 11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
| 11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
| 11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
| 11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
| 11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
| 11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
| 11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
| 11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
| 11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
| 11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
| 11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
| 11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
| 11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
| 11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
| 11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
| 11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
| 11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
| 11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
| 11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
| 11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
| 11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
| 11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
| 11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
| 11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
| 11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
| 11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
| 11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
| 11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
| 11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
| 11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
| 11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
| 11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
| 11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
| 11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
| 11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
| 11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
| 11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
| 11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
| 11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
| 11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
| 11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
| 11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| 11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
| 11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
| 11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| 11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
| 11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
| 11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
| 17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
| 11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
| 11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
| 11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
| 11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
| 11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
| 11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
| 11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
| 11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
| 11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
| 11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
| 11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
| 11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
| 11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
| 11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
| 11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| 11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
| 11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
| 11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
| 11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
| 11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
| 11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
| 11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
| 11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
| 11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
| 11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
| 11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
| 11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
| 11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
| 11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
| 11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
| 11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
| 11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
| 11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
| 17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
| 17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
| 17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
| 11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
| 17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
| 11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
| 11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
| 11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
| 17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
| 17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
| 11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
| 17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
| 11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
| 11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
| 11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
| 17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
| 11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
| 11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
| 11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
| 17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
| 11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| 11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
| 11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
| 11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
| 11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
| 11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
| 11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
| 11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
| 11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
| 11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
| 17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
| 11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
| 8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
| 3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
| 3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
| 4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
| 7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
| 7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
| 6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
| 6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
| 23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
| 19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
| 23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
| 23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
| 23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
| 19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
| 8188 | Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett] |
| 19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
| 19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
| 18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson] |
| 23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
| 18902 | Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson] |
| 23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
| 19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
| 19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
| 19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
| 19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
| 19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
| 19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
| 19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
| 19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
| 23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
| 19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
| 19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
| 19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
| 23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
| 19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
| 23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
| 19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
| 4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
| 7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
| 18914 | Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen] |
| 19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
| 6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
| 7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
| 7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 9843 | You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson] |
| 14602 | Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 14004 | We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne] |
| 8278 | The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
| 15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
| 19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
| 19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
| 24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
| 11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
| 8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
| 6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
| 8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
| 3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
| 3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
| 8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
| 6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
| 8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
| 23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
| 8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
| 8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
| 8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
| 8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
| 10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
| 6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
| 8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
| 10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
| 19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
| 4042 | Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson] |
| 4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
| 3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
| 3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
| 2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
| 5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
| 2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
| 3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
| 16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
| 6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
| 6383 | Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson] |
| 3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
| 7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
| 6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
| 3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
| 6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
| 6386 | In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson] |
| 3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
| 6175 | External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands] |
| 8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson] |
| 8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson] |
| 11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
| 6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
| 19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
| 19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
| 15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames] |
| 14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart] |
| 4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson] |
| 6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
| 23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
| 19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
| 6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
| 23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
| 19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
| 19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
| 6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
| 6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
| 6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
| 6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
| 19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
| 19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
| 7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
| 7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
| 7331 | A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey] |
| 19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
| 7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
| 3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
| 3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
| 8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
| 6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
| 6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
| 18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
| 8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
| 3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
| 19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
| 7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
| 19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
| 7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
| 7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
| 20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 20076 | An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson] |
| 20074 | We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 20024 | Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 6385 | The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson] |
| 20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
| 6384 | The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson] |
| 23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
| 23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
| 20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
| 19698 | Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta] |
| 3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
| 3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
| 8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
| 3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
| 6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
| 3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
| 3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |