12 ideas
| 12270 | Being is one [Melissus, by Aristotle] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 19525 | If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman] |
| 19524 | We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman] |
| 19518 | Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman] |
| 19519 | Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman] |
| 3059 | There is no real motion, only the appearance of it [Melissus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5100 | The void is not required for change, because a plenum can alter in quality [Aristotle on Melissus] |
| 456 | Nothing could come out of nothing [Melissus] |