14 ideas
10196 | The Axiom of Choice needs a criterion of choice [Black] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
10194 | Two things can only be distinguished by a distinct property or a distinct relation [Black] |
10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
10193 | The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black] |
10195 | If the universe just held two indiscernibles spheres, that refutes the Identity of Indiscernibles [Black] |
12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |