9 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
13230 | Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M] |
13229 | Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M] |
13231 | Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M] |
6853 | Consequentialism wrongly assumes a clear line between an act and its consequences [Crisp,R] |
6854 | Does the environment have value in itself? [Crisp,R] |