Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Mark Colyvan and Peter Klein

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29 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8833 Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
17925 Showing a disproof is impossible is not a proof, so don't eliminate double negation [Colyvan]
17926 Rejecting double negation elimination undermines reductio proofs [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
17924 Excluded middle says P or not-P; bivalence says P is either true or false [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
17929 Löwenheim proved his result for a first-order sentence, and Skolem generalised it [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17930 Axioms are 'categorical' if all of their models are isomorphic [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
17928 Ordinal numbers represent order relations [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
17923 Intuitionists only accept a few safe infinities [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
17941 Infinitesimals were sometimes zero, and sometimes close to zero [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
17922 Reducing real numbers to rationals suggested arithmetic as the foundation of maths [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
17936 Transfinite induction moves from all cases, up to the limit ordinal [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
17940 Most mathematical proofs are using set theory, but without saying so [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
17931 Structuralism say only 'up to isomorphism' matters because that is all there is to it [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
17932 If 'in re' structures relies on the world, does the world contain rich enough structures? [Colyvan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8834 Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8838 If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8839 Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
17943 Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
17939 Mathematics can reveal structural similarities in diverse systems [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
17938 Mathematics can show why some surprising events have to occur [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / m. Explanation by proof
17934 Proof by cases (by 'exhaustion') is said to be unexplanatory [Colyvan]
17933 Reductio proofs do not seem to be very explanatory [Colyvan]
17935 If inductive proofs hold because of the structure of natural numbers, they may explain theorems [Colyvan]
17942 Can a proof that no one understands (of the four-colour theorem) really be a proof? [Colyvan]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
17937 Mathematical generalisation is by extending a system, or by abstracting away from it [Colyvan]