Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, M.R. Ayers and Werner Heisenberg

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37 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
You can only explain the qualities of large objects using entities which lack those qualities [Heisenberg]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg]
Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg]
Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg]
It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg]