Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Georg W.F.Hegel

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430 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom emerges at the end of a process [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
If you hope to improve the world, all you can do is improve yourself [Wittgenstein]
While faith is a passion (as Kierkegaard says), wisdom is passionless [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Hegel produced modern optimism; he failed to grasp that consciousness never progresses [Hegel, by Cioran]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
Hegel was the last philosopher of the Book [Hegel, by Derrida]
Hegel inserted society and history between the God-world, man-nature, man-being binary pairs [Hegel, by Safranski]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy moves essentially in the element of universality [Hegel]
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein]
A philosopher is outside any community of ideas [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is exploration of the rational [Hegel]
Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein]
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to reveal the necessity and rationality of the categories of nature and spirit [Hegel, by Houlgate]
True philosophy aims at absolute unity, while our understanding sees only separation [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
If we look at the world rationally, the world assumes a rational aspect [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Free thinking has no presuppositions [Hegel]
If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein]
What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein]
This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein]
Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein]
Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Hegel doesn't storm the heavens like the giants, but works his way up by syllogisms [Kierkegaard on Hegel]
The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
For Hegel, things are incomplete, and contain external references in their own nature [Hegel, by Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
If we start with indeterminate being, we arrive at being and nothing as a united pair [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality... [Hegel, by Houlgate]
We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being [Hegel]
Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel]
Metaphysics is the lattice which makes incoming material intelligible [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
On the continent it is generally believed that metaphysics died with Hegel [Benardete,JA on Hegel]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein]
Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein]
Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein]
The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein]
We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein]
Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein]
This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Without philosophy, science is barren and futile [Hegel]
Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Truth does not appear by asserting reasons and then counter-reasons [Hegel]
We must break up the rigidity that our understanding has imposed [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Highest reason is aesthetic, and truth and good are subordinate to beauty [Hegel]
The world seems rational to those who look at it rationally [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Let thought follow its own course, and don't interfere [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objectivity is not by correspondence, but by the historical determined necessity of Geist [Hegel, by Pinkard]
Categories create objective experience, but are too conditioned by things to actually grasp them [Hegel]
Subjective and objective are not firmly opposed, but merge into one another [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
The structure of reason is a social and historical achievement [Hegel, by Pinkard]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Truth does not come from giving reasons for and against propositions [Hegel]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Making sufficient reason an absolute devalues the principle of non-contradiction [Hegel, by Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Being and nothing are the same and not the same, which is the identity of identity and non-identity [Hegel]
The so-called world is filled with contradiction [Hegel]
If truth is just non-contradiction, we must take care that our basic concepts aren't contradictory [Hegel]
The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progression, the principle which binds science together [Hegel]
Dialectic is seen in popular proverbs like 'pride comes before a fall' [Hegel]
Socratic dialectic is subjective, but Plato made it freely scientific and objective [Hegel]
Rather than in three stages, Hegel presented his dialectic as 'negation of the negation' [Hegel, by Bowie]
Dialectic is the instability of thoughts generating their opposite, and then new more complex thoughts [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Hegel's dialectic is not thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but usually negation of negation of the negation [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
Older metaphysics became dogmatic, by assuming opposed assertions must be true and false [Hegel]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / b. Category mistake as syntactic
Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein]
Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel]
Genuine truth is the resolution of the highest contradiction [Hegel]
There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
What I hold true must also be part of my feelings and character [Hegel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Hegel, by Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature [Hegel]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein]
Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady]
Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein]
All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein]
The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
The true is the whole [Hegel]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein]
We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein]
In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle is the maxim of definite understanding, but just produces contradictions [Hegel]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour [Wittgenstein]
Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock]
The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein]
Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein]
'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Negation of negation doubles back into a self-relationship [Hegel, by Houlgate]
We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein]
'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed [Wittgenstein]
A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein]
Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Wittgenstein, by Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Wittgenstein, by Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
The idea that contradiction is essential to rational understanding is a key modern idea [Hegel]
Tenderness for the world solves the antinomies; contradiction is in our reason, not in the essence of the world [Hegel]
Antinomies are not just in four objects, but in all objects, all representations, all objects and all ideas [Hegel]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / a. Defining numbers
The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common [Wittgenstein]
A number is a repeated operation [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Wittgenstein, by Monk]
The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The dialectical opposition of being and nothing is resolved in passing to the concept of becoming [Hegel, by Scruton]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
To grasp an existence, we must consider its non-existence [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Nothing exists, as thinkable and expressible [Hegel]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Thinking of nothing is not the same as simply not thinking [Hegel, by Houlgate]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Personality overcomes subjective limitations and posits Dasein as its own [Hegel]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Hegel gives an ontological proof of the existence of everything [Hegel, by Scruton]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
The ground of a thing is not another thing, but the first thing's substance or rational concept [Hegel, by Houlgate]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein]
The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein]
The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein]
The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein]
If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein]
Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein]
Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Kant's thing-in-itself is just an abstraction from our knowledge; things only exist for us [Hegel, by Bowie]
Hegel believe that the genuine categories reveal things in themselves [Hegel, by Houlgate]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
Facts can be both positive and negative [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein]
The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein]
On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories [Hegel]
Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories [Hegel]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
For Hegel, categories shift their form in the course of history [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Our concepts and categories disclose the world, because we are part of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Hegel said Kant's fixed categories actually vary with culture and era [Hegel, by Houlgate]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
The nature of each category relates itself to another [Hegel]
The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one [Wittgenstein]
A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it [Wittgenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Objects are simple [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts [Hegel]
Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
We accept substance, to avoid infinite backwards chains of meaning [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation [Hegel]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates [Hegel]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM]
An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein]
The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
In absolute knowing, the gap between object and oneself closes, producing certainty [Hegel]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I develop philosophical science from the simplest appearance of immediate consciousness [Hegel, by Hegel]
The Cogito is at the very centre of the entire concern of modern philosophy [Hegel]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Being is Thought [Hegel]
The 'absolute idea' is when all the contradictions are exhausted [Hegel, by Bowie]
In the Absolute everything is the same [Hegel]
Genuine idealism is seeing the ideal structure of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate]
The Absolute is not supposed to be comprehended, but felt and intuited [Hegel]
Hegel, unlike Kant, said how things appear is the same as how things are [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
Hegel's non-subjective idealism is the unity of subjective and objective viewpoints [Hegel, by Pinkard]
Hegel claimed his system was about the world, but it only mapped conceptual interdependence [Pinkard on Hegel]
Authentic thinking and reality have the same content [Hegel]
The Absolute is the primitive system of concepts which are actualised [Hegel, by Gardner]
The absolute idea is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and all truth [Hegel]
The absolute idea is the great unity of the infinite system of concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
Existence is just a set of relationships [Hegel]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Hegel reputedly claimed to know a priori that there are five planets [Hegel, by Field,H]
My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein]
The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Experience is immediacy, unity, forces, self-awareness, reason, culture, absolute being [Hegel, by Houlgate]
The sensible is distinguished from thought by being about singular things [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein]
As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Hegel tried to avoid Kant's dualism of neutral intuitions and imposed concepts [Hegel, by Pinkard]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Sense perception is secondary and dependent, while thought is independent and primitive [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims [Hegel]
Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricism unknowingly contains and uses a metaphysic, which underlies its categories [Hegel]
Empiricism of the finite denies the supersensible, and can only think with formal abstraction [Hegel]
The Humean view stops us thinking about perception, and finding universals and necessities in it [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Consciousness derives its criterion of knowledge from direct knowledge of its own being [Hegel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Humean scepticism, unlike ancient Greek scepticism, accepts the truth of experience as basic [Hegel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
It is a rejection of intellectual dignity to say that we cannot know the truth [Hegel]
Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M]
One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Wittgenstein, by Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein]
Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein]
To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness is shaped dialectically, by opposing forces and concepts [Hegel, by Aho]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Consciousness is both of objects, and of itself [Hegel]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein]
If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Hegel claims knowledge of self presupposes desire, and hence objects [Hegel, by Scruton]
A person is a being which is aware of its own self-directed and free subjectivity [Hegel]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [Wittgenstein, by McGinn]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
For Hegel knowledge of self presupposes objects, and also a public and moral social world [Hegel, by Scruton]
A human only become a somebody as a member of a social estate [Hegel]
Individuals attain their right by discovering their self-consciousness in institutions [Hegel]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
A free will primarily wills its own freedoom [Hegel, by Houlgate]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Freedom is produced by the activity of the mind, and is not intrinsically given [Hegel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity [Hegel, by Pinkard]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The act of thinking is the bringing forth of universals [Hegel]
Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following
Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein]
One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein]
If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein]
An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 2. Categories of Understanding
Hegel's system has a vast number of basic concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein]
Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie]
We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel]
Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke]
Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein]
Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein]
Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein]
Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein]
A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein]
The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein]
Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein]
Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands]
We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein]
In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein]
We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein]
Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein]
Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein]
To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein]
Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein]
If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein]
We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein]
If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein]
If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton]
Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein]
To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The concept of the will is the free will which wills its freedom [Hegel]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Evil enters a good will when we believe we are doing right, but allow no criticism of our choice [Hegel, by Houlgate]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Nineteenth century aesthetics focused on art rather than nature (thanks to Hegel) [Hegel, by Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Hegel largely ignores aesthetic pleasure, taste and beauty, and focuses on the meaning of artworks [Hegel, by Pinkard]
Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful" [Wittgenstein]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Natural beauty is unimportant, because it doesn't show human freedom [Hegel, by Pinkard]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
For Hegel the importance of art concerns the culture, not the individual [Hegel, by Eldridge]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
The purpose of art is to reveal to Spirit its own nature [Hegel, by Davies,S]
The main purpose of art is to express the unity of human life [Hegel]
Art forms a bridge between the sensuous world and the world of pure thought [Hegel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics cannot be put into words [Wittgenstein]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Conscience is the right of the self to know what is right and obligatory, and thus make them true [Hegel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Man is God if he raises himself, by denying his nature and finitude [Hegel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is ethical life in its natural form [Hegel]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
World history has no room for happiness [Hegel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
You can't have a morality which is supplied by the individual, but is also genuinely universal [Hegel, by MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative lacks roots in a historical culture [Hegel, by Bowie]
Be a person, and respect other persons [Hegel]
The categorical imperative is fine if you already have a set of moral principles [Hegel]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The good is realised freedom [Hegel]
Humans have no fixed identity, but produce and reveal their shifting identity in history [Hegel, by Houlgate]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
The in-itself must become for-itself, which requires self-consciousness [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
The state of nature is one of untamed brutality [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Hegel's Absolute Spirit is the union of human rational activity at a moment, and whatever that sustains [Hegel, by Eldridge]
The family is the first basis of the state, but estates are a necessary second [Hegel]
The soul of the people is an organisation of its members which produces an essential unity [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
We cannot assert rights which are unnatural [Hegel]
We are only free, with rights, if we claim our freedom, and there are no natural rights [Hegel, by Houlgate]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
I aim to portray the state as a rational entity [Hegel]
Society draws people, and requires their work, making them wholly dependent on it [Hegel]
The state is the march of God in the world [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Society isn’t founded on a contract, since contracts presuppose a society [Hegel, by Scruton]
Individuals can't leave the state, because they are natural citizens, and humans require a state [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A fully developed state is conscious and knows what it wills [Hegel]
The people do not have the ability to know the general will [Hegel]
The great man of the ages is the one who reveals and accomplishes the will of his time [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
A constitution embodies a nation's rights and condition [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Individuals must dedicate themselves to the ethical whole, and give their lives when asked [Hegel]
Social groups must focus on the state, which must in turn respect their inclusion and their will [Hegel]
People can achieve respect for their state by insight into its essence [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
All revolutions result from spirit changing its categories, to achieve a deeper understanding [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
In the 1840s Hegel seemed to defend society being right as it is, as a manifestation of Mind [Hegel, by Singer]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Majority rule means obligations can be imposed on me [Hegel]
The state should reflect all interests, and not just popular will, or a popular party [Hegel, by Houlgate]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
Representatives by region ignores whether they care about the national interest [Hegel, by Pinkard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
In modern states an individual's actions should be their choice [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
The human race matters, and individuals have little importance [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Modern life needs individuality, but must recognise that human agency is social [Hegel, by Pinkard]
Human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds [Hegel]
Moral individuals become ethical when they see the social aspect of a matter [Hegel, by Houlgate]
For Hegel, the moral life can only be led within a certain type of community [Hegel, by MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Even educated women are unsuited to science, philosophy, art and government [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
In a good state the goal of the citizens and of the whole state are united [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slaves have no duties because they have no rights [Hegel]
Slaves are partly responsible for their own condition [Hegel]
State slavery is a phase of education, moving towards a full culture [Hegel]
Slavery is unjust, because humanity is essentially free [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
True liberal freedom is to pursue something, while being free to cease the pursuit [Hegel, by Houlgate]
People assume they are free, but the options available are not under their control [Hegel]
The goal of the world is Spirit's consciousness and enactment of freedom [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Freedom requires us to submit to a family, or a corporation, or a state [Hegel, by Houlgate]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Money is the best way to achieve just equality [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights imply duties, and duties imply rights [Hegel]
The absolute right is the right to have rights [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Man has an absolute right to appropriate things [Hegel]
Because only human beings can own property, everything else can become our property [Hegel]
A community does not have the property-owning rights that a person has [Hegel]
The owner of a thing is obviously the first person to freely take possession of it [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Wars add strength to a nation, and cure internal dissension [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Children need discipline, to break their self-will and eradicate sensuousness [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
History is the progress of the consciousness of freedom [Hegel]
We should all agree that there is reason in history [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
When man wills the natural, it is no longer natural [Hegel]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible [Hegel]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The movement of pure essences constitutes the nature of scientific method [Hegel]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Science confronts the inner necessities of objects [Hegel]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
If God is the abstract of Supremely Real Essence, then God is a mere Beyond, and unknowable [Hegel]
The older conception of God was emptied of human features, to make it worthy of the Infinite [Hegel]
God is the absolute thing, and also the absolute person [Hegel]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
The God of revealed religion can only be understood through pure speculative knowledge [Hegel]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Hegel's entire philosophy is nothing but a monstrous amplification of the ontological proof [Schopenhauer on Hegel]
We establish unification of the Ideal by the ontological proof, deriving being from abstraction of thinking [Hegel]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
God is the essence of thought, abstracted from the thinker [Hegel, by Feuerbach]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Hegel made the last attempt to restore Christianity, which philosophy had destroyed [Hegel, by Feuerbach]
To universalise 'give everything to the poor' leads to absurdity [Hegel]
Hegel said he was offering an encyclopaedic rationalisation of Christianity [Hegel, by Graham]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
To have pagan beliefs and be a pagan are quite different [Hegel]
Some religions lead to harsh servitude and the debasement of human beings [Hegel]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / b. Religious Meaning
Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Immortality does not come at a later time, but when pure knowing Spirit fully grasps the universal [Hegel]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein]