Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Keith Campbell and Wolfgang von Goethe

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25 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8525 Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8518 Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8513 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
8514 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
8522 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
8523 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
8524 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8521 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8515 Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
8519 Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
4033 Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
7544 Many people imagine that to experience is to understand [Goethe]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
7541 Man never understands how anthropomorphic he is [Goethe]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
7543 We gain self-knowledge through action, not thought - especially when doing our duty [Goethe]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8512 Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
7540 Beauty is a manifestation of secret natural laws [Goethe]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
7538 The happiest people link the beginning and end of life [Goethe]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
7542 The best form of government teaches us to govern ourselves [Goethe]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
7539 To get duties from people without rights, you must pay them well [Goethe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8516 Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
8517 Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]