9 ideas
| 18491 | The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne] |
| 19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |
| 19137 | We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy] |
| 14180 | Etchemendy says fix the situation and vary the interpretation, or fix interpretations with varying situations [Etchemendy, by Read] |
| 14181 | Validity is where either the situation or the interpretation blocks true premises and false conclusion [Etchemendy, by Read] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |