11 ideas
| 8956 | What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 8953 | Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 8954 | Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó] |
| 8955 | Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó] |
| 15675 | We don't condemn people for being bad at reasoning [Finlayson] |
| 15674 | One can universalise good advice, but that doesn't make it an obligation [Finlayson] |
| 15662 | The 'culture industry' is an advertisement for the way things are [Finlayson] |