16 ideas
| 22334 | Analysis must include definitions, search for simples, concept analysis, and Kant's analysis [Glock] |
| 18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
| 18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
| 18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
| 18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
| 18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
| 18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
| 18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 22332 | German and British idealism is not about individual ideas, but the intelligibility of reality [Glock] |
| 22335 | The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept [Glock] |
| 22336 | We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use [Glock] |
| 18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |