Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, G Edelman / G Tononi and John Kekes

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90 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Prior to language, concepts are universals created by self-mapping of brain activity [Edelman/Tononi]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Cultures have a common core of colour naming, based on three axes of colour pairs [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
A conscious human being rapidly reunifies its mind after any damage to the brain [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
A conscious state endures for about 100 milliseconds, known as the 'specious present' [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness is a process (of neural interactions), not a location, thing, property, connectivity, or activity [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
The three essentials of conscious experience are privateness, unity and informativeness [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Consciousness can create new axioms, but computers can't do that [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness arises from high speed interactions between clusters of neurons [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Dreams and imagery show the brain can generate awareness and meaning without input [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Physicists see information as a measure of order, but for biologists it is symbolic exchange between animals [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
The sensation of red is a point in neural space created by dimensions of neuronal activity [Edelman/Tononi]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
The self is founded on bodily awareness centred in the brain stem [Edelman/Tononi]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
A sense of self begins either internally, or externally through language and society [Edelman/Tononi]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Brains can initiate free actions before the person is aware of their own decision [Edelman/Tononi]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Consciousness is a process, not a thing, as it maintains unity as its composition changes [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
Brain complexity balances segregation and integration, like a good team of specialists [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Information-processing views of the brain assume the existence of 'information', and dubious brain codes [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Consciousness involves interaction with persons and the world, as well as brain functions [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Concepts and generalisations result from brain 'global mapping' by 'reentry' [Edelman/Tononi, by Searle]
Concepts arise when the brain maps its own activities [Edelman/Tononi]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes]
Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes]
Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes]
Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes]
Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes]
Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes]
Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes]
Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes]
Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes]
Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes]
Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes]
If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Systems that generate a sense of value are basic to the primitive brain [Edelman/Tononi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes]
Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes]
Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Control is the key to well-being [Kekes]
Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes]
Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes]
The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes]
Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes]
Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes]
Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes]
Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes]
Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes]
It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes]
The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes]
Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes]