16 ideas
18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
13127 | Categories can't overlap; they are either disjoint, or inclusive [Sommers, by Westerhoff] |
18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
20739 | Levinas took 'first philosophy' to begin with seeing the vulnerable faces of others [Levinas, by Aho] |
20445 | Levinas says Marxism is the replacement of individualist ethics, by solidarity and sociality [Levinas, by Critchley] |