16 ideas
| 17744 | De Morgan started the study of relations and their properties [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
| 13501 | De Morgan found inferences involving relations, which eluded Aristotle's syllogistic [De Morgan, by Hart,WD] |
| 17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
| 19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
| 19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
| 19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
| 19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
| 19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
| 19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
| 12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee] |
| 12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee] |