16 ideas
9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
19525 | If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman] |
9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
19524 | We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman] |
19518 | Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman] |
9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
19519 | Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman] |
9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |