Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, E Conee / R Feldman and Carrie Jenkins

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
17729 Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
17740 Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
17730 Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17719 Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins]
17717 Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
17724 It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17727 We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17720 There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
17728 The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
19525 If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
17726 Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
17734 It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19524 We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19518 Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
17723 Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
17718 Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins]
17739 The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
17731 Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
17732 Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
17725 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
19519 Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman]