12 ideas
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16659 | Relations do not add anything to reality, though they are real aspects of the world [Olivi] |
| 18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |
| 18432 | Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards] |
| 18437 | Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards] |
| 16672 | Quantity is the quantified parts of a thing, plus location and coordination [Olivi] |
| 16673 | Quantity just adds union and location to the extension of parts [Olivi] |
| 18434 | That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards] |
| 16663 | Things are limited by the species to certain modes of being [Olivi] |