272 ideas
22115 | Wise people should contemplate and discuss the truth, and fight against falsehood [Aquinas] |
22101 | Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are [Aquinas] |
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
21267 | Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas] |
22102 | Arguing with opponents uncovers truths, and restrains falsehoods [Aquinas] |
13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
23176 | Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas] |
20621 | Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
8188 | Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
21248 | If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas] |
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
22104 | Truth is the conformity of being to intellect [Aquinas] |
18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson] |
23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
18902 | Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson] |
23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
23173 | If a syllogism admits one absurdity, others must follow [Aquinas] |
7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
18914 | Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
11195 | If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas] |
22103 | Being is basic to thought, and all other concepts are additions to being [Aquinas] |
15812 | Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude [Aquinas] |
7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
9843 | You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson] |
14602 | Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
14004 | We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne] |
8278 | The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
21268 | Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed [Aquinas] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
16655 | Different genera are delimited by modes of predication, which rest on modes of being [Aquinas] |
16641 | Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white [Aquinas] |
11201 | Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
11205 | If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas] |
13090 | The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17555 | 'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas] |
16765 | Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them [Aquinas] |
16766 | One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them [Aquinas] |
11202 | It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas] |
11203 | Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas] |
11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
11196 | Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas] |
11208 | A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
22170 | Senses grasp external properties, but the understanding grasps the essential natures of things [Aquinas] |
11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
23175 | The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas] |
21337 | A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas] |
21249 | Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves [Aquinas] |
22169 | Initial universal truths are present within us as potential, to be drawn out by reason [Aquinas] |
21250 | A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas] |
22168 | Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas] |
20224 | Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason [Aquinas] |
8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
22109 | The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
11198 | Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas] |
3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
22107 | Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
9098 | Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present [Aquinas] |
9092 | Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas] |
9093 | We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas] |
9097 | The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding [Aquinas] |
9095 | Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas] |
9099 | Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas] |
10508 | Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions [Aquinas] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
4042 | Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson] |
22111 | Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
22105 | The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas] |
20700 | Without God's influence every operation would stop, so God causes everything [Aquinas] |
4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
6383 | Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson] |
3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
22108 | First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas] |
6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
6386 | In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson] |
3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
6175 | External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands] |
8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson] |
8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson] |
11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
10503 | We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things [Aquinas] |
10509 | Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species [Aquinas] |
10506 | Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter [Aquinas] |
9094 | Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance [Aquinas] |
10505 | We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature [Aquinas] |
10504 | Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately [Aquinas] |
10507 | Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities [Aquinas] |
9096 | The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species [Aquinas] |
6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames] |
14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart] |
4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson] |
6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
11206 | The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
7331 | A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20076 | An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson] |
20074 | We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20024 | Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
23180 | The will is the rational appetite [Aquinas] |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
6385 | The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson] |
20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
6384 | The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson] |
23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
19698 | Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta] |
3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
22112 | For humans good is accordance with reason, and bad is contrary to reason [Aquinas] |
22494 | We must know the end, know that it is the end, and know how to attain it [Aquinas] |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
23181 | All acts of virtue relate to justice, which is directed towards the common good [Aquinas] |
8009 | Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre] |
23182 | Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good [Aquinas] |
22399 | Temperance prevents our passions from acting against reason [Aquinas] |
23177 | Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality [Aquinas] |
23179 | People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each [Aquinas] |
22114 | Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws [Aquinas] |
23174 | Natural law is a rational creature's participation in eternal law [Aquinas] |
22113 | Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason [Aquinas] |
7291 | For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Aquinas, by Grayling] |
3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
5508 | Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Aquinas, by Martin/Barresi] |
16687 | Bodies are three-dimensional substances [Aquinas] |
8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
11207 | A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
15202 | Eternity coexists with passing time, as the centre of a circle coexists with its circumference [Aquinas] |
23178 | Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded [Aquinas] |
21251 | We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us [Aquinas] |
5614 | If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant on Aquinas] |
21269 | Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas] |
21270 | Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas] |
21271 | Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas] |
21272 | Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas] |
21273 | Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas] |
20211 | Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Aquinas, by Zagzebski] |
22106 | Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
16711 | Heretics should be eradicated like wolves [Aquinas] |
1863 | If the soul achieves well-being in another life, it doesn't follow that I do [Aquinas] |
23306 | Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Aquinas, by Sorabji] |
4412 | Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished [Aquinas] |
21266 | God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable [Aquinas] |
21274 | It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil [Aquinas] |