Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Dean W. Zimmerman and Susan Haack

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11 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
2572 Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
2570 The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
10197 An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
10198 If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
10199 Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
14610 Neither 'moving spotlight' nor 'growing block' views explain why we care what is present or past [Zimmerman,DW]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
14608 A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future [Zimmerman,DW]