84 ideas
| 14713 | Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers] |
| 21382 | Things get smaller without end [Anaxagoras] |
| 481 | Nothing is created or destroyed; there is only mixing and separation [Anaxagoras] |
| 21822 | Anaxagoras's concept of supreme Mind has a simple First and a multiple One [Anaxagoras, by Plotinus] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 2392 | Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers] |
| 2393 | Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2394 | Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2398 | Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 17995 | Basic is the potentially perceptible, then comes the contrary qualities, and finally the 'elements' [Anaxagoras] |
| 16048 | Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 2401 | All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers] |
| 16425 | Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers] |
| 16424 | Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers] |
| 16426 | How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers] |
| 13956 | Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers] |
| 13963 | Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers] |
| 16473 | Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker] |
| 19258 | Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya] |
| 2407 | One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers] |
| 2390 | We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers] |
| 14712 | A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers] |
| 20802 | Snow is not white, and doesn't even appear white, because it is made of black water [Anaxagoras, by Cicero] |
| 2397 | 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers] |
| 2422 | The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers] |
| 13257 | The senses are too feeble to determine the truth [Anaxagoras] |
| 22761 | We reveal unreliability in the senses when we cannot discriminate a slow change of colour [Anaxagoras, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 2396 | Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers] |
| 13256 | Nous is unlimited, self-ruling and pure; it is the finest thing, with great discernment and strength [Anaxagoras] |
| 13784 | Mind is self-ruling, pure, ordering and ubiquitous [Anaxagoras, by Plato] |
| 2426 | Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers] |
| 2391 | Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers] |
| 2412 | Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2386 | Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers] |
| 2416 | What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2423 | Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers] |
| 2403 | Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2400 | Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers] |
| 2419 | Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers] |
| 2389 | Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers] |
| 2402 | It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers] |
| 2415 | In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers] |
| 2414 | When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers] |
| 5118 | Anaxagoras says mind remains pure, and so is not affected by what it changes [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle] |
| 2409 | Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers] |
| 2411 | Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers] |
| 2424 | It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers] |
| 2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2417 | Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers] |
| 2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
| 2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
| 2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
| 2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
| 2395 | Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
| 2429 | Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers] |
| 18403 | Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers] |
| 14708 | Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter] |
| 13958 | The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers] |
| 2399 | Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers] |
| 13959 | The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers] |
| 13957 | Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 13961 | We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers] |
| 14739 | 'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider] |
| 13962 | Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers] |
| 13960 | In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 18231 | Anaxagoras said a person would choose to be born to contemplate the ordered heavens [Anaxagoras] |
| 631 | For Anaxagoras the Good Mind has no opposite, and causes all movement, for a higher reason [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle] |
| 22727 | Mind creates the world from a mixture of pure substances [Anaxagoras, by ] |
| 550 | Anaxagoras said that the number of principles was infinite [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle] |
| 21383 | The ultimate constituents of reality are the homoeomeries [Anaxagoras, by Vlastos] |
| 13208 | Anaxagoreans regard the homoeomeries as elements, which compose earth, air, fire and water [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle] |
| 367 | Anaxagoras says mind produces order and causes everything [Anaxagoras, by Plato] |
| 21381 | Germs contain microscopic organs, which become visible as they grow [Anaxagoras] |
| 22726 | When things were unified, Mind set them in order [Anaxagoras] |
| 2629 | Anaxagoras was the first to say that the universe is directed by an intelligence [Anaxagoras, by Cicero] |
| 16427 | Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers] |
| 480 | Past, present and future, and the movements of the heavens, were arranged by Mind [Anaxagoras] |
| 7488 | Anaxagoras was the first recorded atheist [Anaxagoras, by Watson] |
| 5956 | Anaxagoras was charged with impiety for calling the sun a lump of stone [Anaxagoras, by Plutarch] |