13 ideas
| 13831 | Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz] |
| 13827 | Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz] |
| 13825 | Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz] |
| 13823 | In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz] |
| 13826 | Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 19722 | We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag] |
| 19723 | Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag] |
| 19720 | Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag] |
| 19721 | Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag] |