14 ideas
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 19558 | Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S] |
| 19561 | We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S] |
| 19563 | The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S] |
| 19560 | Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S] |
| 12893 | Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S] |
| 12896 | Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S] |
| 12894 | There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S] |
| 19559 | Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S] |
| 20721 | Punctuality and justice in dealings are excellent for raising a man in the world [Franklin] |
| 20720 | Time is money, ..credit is money, ..and money breeds more money [Franklin] |