15 ideas
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
| 13437 | A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois] |
| 15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
| 16233 | Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois] |
| 16025 | If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois] |
| 16026 | 4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time [Gallois] |
| 14755 | Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider] |
| 16231 | Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley] |
| 16027 | If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois] |
| 15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
| 15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |