11 ideas
| 17879 | Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem] |
| 13536 | Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem] |
| 17878 | If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem] |
| 17880 | Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem] |
| 17881 | Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 5987 | Alcmaeon was the first to say the brain is central to thinking [Alcmaeon, by Staden, von] |
| 24043 | Soul must be immortal, since it continually moves, like the heavens [Alcmaeon, by Aristotle] |