353 ideas
| 7504 | Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault] |
| 3600 | Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes] |
| 3656 | The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes] |
| 9218 | Maybe what distinguishes philosophy from science is its pursuit of necessary truths [Sider] |
| 24032 | Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes] |
| 3601 | Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes] |
| 3602 | Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes] |
| 15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
| 14721 | Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider] |
| 21962 | Metaphysics is the roots of the tree of science [Descartes] |
| 14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
| 14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
| 15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
| 14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
| 24033 | Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes] |
| 3653 | My Meditations are the complete foundation of my physics [Descartes] |
| 1569 | Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 24024 | The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes] |
| 3603 | Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG] |
| 2248 | Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes] |
| 24018 | One truth leads us to another [Descartes] |
| 2857 | Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
| 14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
| 3612 | Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes] |
| 2290 | Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes] |
| 3659 | I know the truth that God exists and is the author of truth [Descartes] |
| 3641 | It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes] |
| 4524 | Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 4736 | Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined [Descartes] |
| 14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
| 3610 | Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes] |
| 2266 | My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes] |
| 4301 | Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes] |
| 15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
| 4298 | All items of possible human knowledge are interconnected, and can be reached by inference [Descartes] |
| 13689 | 'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider] |
| 13705 | Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider] |
| 13706 | Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider] |
| 13710 | In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider] |
| 13711 | System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider] |
| 13708 | S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider] |
| 13712 | Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider] |
| 13714 | We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider] |
| 13720 | Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider] |
| 13718 | The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider] |
| 13723 | System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider] |
| 15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
| 13715 | You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider] |
| 15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
| 14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
| 14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
| 15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
| 15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
| 13678 | The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider] |
| 13679 | Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation [Sider] |
| 13682 | Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false [Sider] |
| 13680 | Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion [Sider] |
| 15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
| 13722 | A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof [Sider] |
| 10054 | Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes] |
| 15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
| 13696 | When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider] |
| 13700 | A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain [Sider] |
| 13703 | λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate [Sider] |
| 13688 | Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths [Sider] |
| 13687 | No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio [Sider] |
| 13690 | Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms [Sider] |
| 13691 | Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step' [Sider] |
| 15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
| 13685 | Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions [Sider] |
| 13686 | We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae [Sider] |
| 13697 | Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider] |
| 13684 | The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations [Sider] |
| 13704 | It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators [Sider] |
| 13724 | In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation [Sider] |
| 13698 | In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences [Sider] |
| 13699 | Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite [Sider] |
| 2252 | Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes] |
| 2430 | I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes] |
| 13445 | Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD] |
| 24035 | Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes] |
| 24036 | I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes] |
| 13701 | A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically [Sider] |
| 21963 | It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes] |
| 24029 | Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes] |
| 14760 | Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider] |
| 15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
| 3644 | Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes] |
| 15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
| 15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
| 15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
| 15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
| 13692 | A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider] |
| 13695 | Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider] |
| 13693 | A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider] |
| 13694 | We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider] |
| 14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
| 13683 | A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider] |
| 14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
| 14194 | Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider] |
| 14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
| 16635 | Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
| 16744 | All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes] |
| 5016 | Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes] |
| 5015 | A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes] |
| 14745 | If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider] |
| 2297 | If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes] |
| 3626 | Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes] |
| 16630 | If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes] |
| 5013 | A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes] |
| 3628 | Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 16774 | Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
| 14740 | If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider] |
| 14752 | Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider] |
| 14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
| 14747 | 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider] |
| 16631 | If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes] |
| 17865 | Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog] |
| 16633 | A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes] |
| 14757 | Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider] |
| 12251 | Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes] |
| 15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
| 14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
| 14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
| 14726 | Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider] |
| 14728 | 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider] |
| 14729 | 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider] |
| 14730 | Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider] |
| 14731 | Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider] |
| 14758 | How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider] |
| 14762 | Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider] |
| 14741 | The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider] |
| 13702 | The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider] |
| 14754 | If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider] |
| 13721 | 'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider] |
| 13707 | Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider] |
| 13709 | Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider] |
| 13716 | 'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider] |
| 15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
| 15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
| 15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
| 15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
| 24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
| 15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
| 15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
| 2301 | We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes] |
| 3642 | Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes] |
| 13717 | Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider] |
| 14763 | Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider] |
| 13719 | Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider] |
| 3605 | We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes] |
| 20190 | Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski] |
| 24019 | If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes] |
| 9807 | In pursuing truth, anything less certain than mathematics is a waste of time [Descartes] |
| 1583 | In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 1585 | Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 1582 | Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 2256 | Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes] |
| 3657 | Understanding, not the senses, gives certainty [Descartes] |
| 2260 | If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes] |
| 3607 | In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes] |
| 3658 | Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes] |
| 6914 | Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 4641 | In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl] |
| 5005 | I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes] |
| 5006 | 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes] |
| 24020 | We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes] |
| 24031 | When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes] |
| 6929 | Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 3849 | "I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes] |
| 2258 | I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes] |
| 2259 | "I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes] |
| 3160 | The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes] |
| 3622 | The Cogito is not a syllogism but a self-evident intuition [Descartes] |
| 3623 | The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes] |
| 1369 | It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes] |
| 5360 | The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes] |
| 2870 | 'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 5188 | A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes] |
| 3624 | That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 3120 | Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes] |
| 4526 | The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 5579 | How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5580 | My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5587 | We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5588 | The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes] |
| 13923 | Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe] |
| 6930 | Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes] |
| 1117 | The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes] |
| 2873 | Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 2261 | My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes] |
| 2257 | I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes] |
| 24025 | Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes] |
| 24022 | Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes] |
| 3630 | Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes] |
| 2279 | A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes] |
| 5012 | 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes] |
| 2602 | What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes] |
| 3617 | I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes] |
| 6490 | For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H] |
| 22593 | Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation [Descartes] |
| 7400 | Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck] |
| 2295 | Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes] |
| 3627 | Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2265 | We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes] |
| 3611 | Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes] |
| 2263 | The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes] |
| 2264 | We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes] |
| 24034 | If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes] |
| 604 | Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle] |
| 24021 | The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes] |
| 3606 | I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes] |
| 2247 | To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes] |
| 2255 | Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes] |
| 5004 | We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes] |
| 2251 | Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes] |
| 6347 | Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes] |
| 2296 | If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes] |
| 3620 | We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes] |
| 3619 | The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2249 | It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes] |
| 3621 | Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes] |
| 2253 | God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes] |
| 2254 | To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes] |
| 2305 | Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes] |
| 3604 | When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes] |
| 2294 | I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes] |
| 3618 | Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes] |
| 14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
| 14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
| 14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
| 14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
| 14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
| 15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
| 15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
| 4862 | Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
| 3850 | We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes] |
| 2302 | Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes] |
| 3615 | Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes] |
| 24027 | Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes] |
| 5014 | We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes] |
| 16634 | I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes] |
| 15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
| 3151 | Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes] |
| 24026 | Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes] |
| 21800 | Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid] |
| 1399 | Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes] |
| 1400 | Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes] |
| 3609 | I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes] |
| 1401 | Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes] |
| 2299 | I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes] |
| 6907 | For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 5017 | In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes] |
| 2283 | Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes] |
| 5010 | Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes] |
| 3789 | The more reasons that compel me, the freer I am [Descartes] |
| 2282 | My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes] |
| 4310 | We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes] |
| 24028 | The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes] |
| 3608 | I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes] |
| 3613 | Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes] |
| 2276 | The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes] |
| 2298 | Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes] |
| 3423 | Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim] |
| 2303 | The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes] |
| 5011 | There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes] |
| 3616 | The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes] |
| 6153 | Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes] |
| 6553 | Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan] |
| 3654 | The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG] |
| 3625 | The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 2552 | Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes] |
| 4305 | Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes] |
| 4861 | Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
| 6540 | Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes] |
| 7733 | Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes] |
| 5018 | Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes] |
| 3643 | The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes] |
| 5686 | In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes] |
| 4015 | For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
| 4313 | Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham] |
| 23989 | There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie] |
| 4017 | Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
| 2284 | I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes] |
| 5007 | Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes] |
| 3614 | A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes] |
| 5685 | True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes] |
| 3629 | All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 3631 | A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes] |
| 2600 | The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes] |
| 2273 | The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes] |
| 2285 | I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes] |
| 2601 | Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes] |
| 2286 | The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes] |
| 14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
| 14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
| 15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
| 20037 | Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes] |
| 5009 | We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes] |
| 5008 | The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes] |
| 16763 | We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes] |
| 1581 | Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes] |
| 4016 | Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
| 3635 | Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes] |
| 19676 | Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux] |
| 15987 | Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes] |
| 2280 | Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes] |
| 12730 | We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes] |
| 24023 | All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes] |
| 16569 | The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained [Descartes] |
| 16684 | Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension [Descartes] |
| 6518 | Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes] |
| 16601 | Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes] |
| 2272 | There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes] |
| 16686 | God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes] |
| 14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
| 14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
| 14725 | Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider] |
| 20964 | Descartes said there was conservation of 'quantity of motion' [Descartes, by Papineau] |
| 14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
| 14735 | Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider] |
| 15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
| 15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
| 14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
| 14756 | For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider] |
| 14724 | Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider] |
| 14723 | Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider] |
| 14736 | The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider] |
| 14734 | The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider] |
| 2269 | God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes] |
| 2289 | Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes] |
| 2275 | It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes] |
| 3637 | Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so [Descartes] |
| 2287 | Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes] |
| 2268 | One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes] |
| 3640 | Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes] |
| 2274 | The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes] |
| 3639 | Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes] |
| 2288 | I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes] |
| 3632 | We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 3633 | We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 5036 | Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes] |
| 3638 | Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 3634 | We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes] |
| 16712 | Atheism is an atrocious and intolerable crime in any country [Descartes] |
| 3660 | Atheism arises from empiricism, because God is intangible [Descartes] |
| 16772 | An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
| 3652 | I can't prove the soul is indestructible, only that it is separate from the mortal body [Descartes] |
| 3636 | God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2278 | Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes] |
| 2277 | Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes] |
| 2281 | If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes] |