Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lamargue,P/Olson,SH, Nelson Goodman and Martin Kusch

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61 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
Classes are a host of ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities [Goodman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Two objects can apparently make up quite distinct arrangements in sets [Goodman, by Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
The counties of Utah, and the state, and its acres, are in no way different [Goodman]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
If we apply the same word to different things, it is only because we are willing to do so [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch]
The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch]
Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch]
Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch]
Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch]
Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch]
Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch]
A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch]
Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch]
Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch]
Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Modern attention has moved from the intrinsic properties of art to its relational properties [Lamarque/Olson]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
Art is a referential activity, hence indefinable, but it has a set of symptoms [Goodman]
Early 20th cent attempts at defining art focused on significant form, intuition, expression, unity [Lamarque/Olson]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 5. Art as Language
Artistic symbols are judged by the fruitfulness of their classifications [Goodman, by Giovannelli]
Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Goodman, by Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
A performance is only an instance of a work if there is not a single error [Goodman]
The dualistic view says works of art are either abstract objects (types), or physical objects [Lamarque/Olson]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 2. Copies of Art
A copy only becomes an 'instance' of an artwork if there is a system of notation [Goodman]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch]