14 ideas
| 19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
| 11257 | The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis] |
| 11235 | 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis] |
| 11277 | Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis] |
| 11248 | Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis] |
| 19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
| 19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
| 19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
| 19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
| 19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| 22110 | Demonstration provides depth of understanding and explanation (rather than foundations) [Kretzmann/Stump] |
| 19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |